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What's in Store for Civil Rights in the 1990s
Calvin L. Scott, Esq.* and Steven W. Zachary, Esq.**
Recent Supreme Court cases in the area of employment dis-
crimination signal the beginning of the crumbling and eventual de-
struction of civil rights laws that have developed since the
abolition of slavery.
Three major cases help make up the foundation of present
day civil rights law: Fullilove v. Klutznick,1 McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green,2 and Runyon v. McCrary.3 In just one term of the
Supreme Court, these three cases were either severely limited or
overturned. Fullilove was limited by City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.;4 McDonnell Douglas essentially was overturned by
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio;5 and Runyon v. McCrary es-
sentially was overturned by Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.6
In Fullilove, the Court considered the constitutionality of a
federal minority set-aside program.7 Through fact-finding Con-
gress had determined that the country had discriminated against
minorities by excluding them from the construction industry.8 In
an attempt to remedy this past discrimination, Congress created a
minority set-aside program for federal construction projects.9
Under this program, a percentage of the federal dollars for con-
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1. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
2. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
3. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
4. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
5. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
6. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
7. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 453 (1980).
8. Id. at 478.
9. Id. The program was part of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116. Id. at 453-54.
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struction projects is set aside for minority contractors.'0 In re-
sponse to this legislation, states set up their own minority set-aside
programs, relying on Congress' findings of discrimination."
After Croson, state and local municipality minority set-aside
plans are essentially unconstitutional. The Croson Court reasoned
that because the City of Richmond had failed to document self-in-
flicted discrimination in the Richmond construction industry when
it set up its set-aside program12 and had instead relied on Con-
gress' earlier findings of discrimination when it created the federal
set-aside program, its minority set-aside program and all other pro-
grams similarly justified were invalid.'3 The Croson Court re-
quired a more particularized finding of discrimination.
14
Presently, therefore, on the state and local level, essentially all mi-
nority set-asides are invalid. On the federal level, however, set-
asides are allowed.
Croson's immediate effect is that once again the door to par-
ticipation in the construction industry has been closed, on the state
and local levels, to minorities, females, and other protected indi-
viduals. Before Fullilove, minorities received only .13% of At-
lanta's government contracts.15 After Fullilove and before Croson,
Atlanta could boast that 34.6% of their government contract dol-
lars went to minority contractors.' 6 Civil rights attorneys fear that
as a result of Croson pre-Fullilove minority contractor figures will
return. Once again, minority and female businesses will not be
subcontractors on state and local projects and will not receive state
or local contracts as they did before Croson.
In response to Croson, the American Contract Compliance
Association is urging state and local municipalities to attempt to
make the particularized finding of discrimination required by the
Court, while plotting other strategies. This is a complicated and
burdensome task. How long documenting particularized discrimi-
nation will take depends on a number of factors, such as the depth
of the data kept by the state or municipality and the availability of
funds to research and make the finding. Presently, the majority of
10. The Act requires state and local government units receiving federal funds
for local public works programs to use 10% of the funds to procure services or sup-
plies from minority business enterprises (MBEs). 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1982).
11. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 726 (1989). See
generally Leslie Nay & James Jones, Jr., Equal Employment and Affirmative Ac-
tion in Local Governments: A Profile, 8 Law & Inequality 103 (1989).
12. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 723-24.
13. Id. at 726.
14. Id. at 727.
15. Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1989, at B5.
16. Id.
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the programs are in the fact-finding posture. At one extreme, ju-
risdictions like Minneapolis are fighting to keep a minority and fe-
male set-aside program without adhering to Croson.17 At the
other extreme, the City of San Francisco has made the particular-
ized findings of self-inflicted discrimination demanded by Croson
and therefore is able to operate a minority and female set-aside
program in compliance with Croson's mandate.' 8
The second major case in the three-tiered foundation of civil
rights law is Runyon v. McCrary.19 A little history of how the
Runyon case became law is important.
After passage of the thirteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution, which outlawed slavery and also gave Con-
gress the authority to pass laws to eliminate effectively the badge
of slavery,20 Congress did pass legislation to eliminate the badge of
slavery. It passed legislation to prohibit lynchings and the racial
harassment of blacks, and to allow blacks to participate in all as-
pects of society.2 ' Runyon upheld the application of the thirteenth
amendment and the legislation that resulted from it to cases of ra-
cial discrimination in private employment. 22
One of the most important aspects of the Runyon decision is
that it provided an opportunity for blacks and other minorities to
file cases against such organizations as the Ku Klux Klan under
Sections 1981 and 1982.23 Throughout the United States there has
been a general acceptance of the doctrine established in Runyon.
This doctrine was so entrenched in law that forty-seven state at-
torneys general asked the Supreme Court to not overturn Runyon
in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.24 Sixty-seven out of the one
hundred United States Senators and 119 out of the 365 members of
the House of Representatives also asked that the Runyon decision
not be overturned.25
Nevertheless, in Patterson v. McLean, the Supreme Court, on
its own motion, asked for a rehearing of Runyon. That action
sounded an alarm to those who support civil rights and a wake-up
17. Star Tribune, Apr. 6, 1989, at lB.
18. San Francisco Cal., Administrative Code Ch. 12D, Ordinance 139-84 (1989).
19. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
20. Eric Foner, An Unfinished Revolution, in The Return of Jim Crow: The
Bitter Fruit of the Reagan Court in Patterson v. McLean 4-5 (1989).
21. Id.
22. Runyon v. McCrary, 472 U.S. 160, 172 (1976) (quoting Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975)).
23. Jeanne Mirer, Questions and Answers, in The Return of Jim Crow: The
Bitter Fruit of the Reagan Court in Patterson v. McLean 10-11 (1989).
24. Id. at 11.
25. Id.
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call welcomed by anti-civil rights white supremacists. The Court's
decisions sent a message that these supremacy groups now had a
powerful ally.
The Patterson Court held that Section 1981 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 cannot be used in cases of racial harassment in
the employment context.26 In theory, Patterson simply limited
Runyon, but the practical effect of the decision was to eliminate
the vehicle through which minorities bring their cases to court. No
longer can a claimant bring Section 1981 cases to federal district
court under a theory of racial harassment. Although Patterson did
not overturn Runyon outright, in essence, the Court threw it out
the back door. Employers cannot discriminate in the selection pro-
cess, but they can treat employees so badly through racial harass-
ment that minorities will quit "voluntarily." So through the back
door, the Court effectively has overturned Runyon.
Patterson will be felt most significantly in southern states
that do not have state legislation prohibiting racial harassment,
where, coincidentally, the Ku Klux Klan continues to run ram-
pant. Minnesota will feel Patterson's effect when white suprema-
cist groups use racial harassment and intimidation to try to
suppress the advancement of blacks and other minorities.
The third case of importance is Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio.27 Wards Cove limited the holding of McDonnell Douglas
by reducing the respondent's burden in an employment discrimi-
nation case brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.28 Instead of placing the burden of persuasion on the em-
ployer to demonstrate the non-discriminatory reason for a particu-
lar business practice, as was required by McDonnell Douglas,29 the
Wards Cove Court held that the complainant had to show that the
reason given by respondent did not have any reasonable business
necessity.3 0 Almost all policies can have some reasonable business
effect, so the Court essentially has held that a complainant will
not be allowed to prove her case.
Second, and equally as devastating, the Wards Cove Court
stated that statistics in and of themselves are not sufficient proof
of discrimination.31 Under Wards Cove, unless a complainant can
show that an employer systematically refused to hire qualified mi-
norities who had in fact applied for jobs, complainant will not pre-
26. Patterson v. McLean, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2373 (1989).
27. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
28. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989).
29. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, n.14 (1973).
30. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-26.
31. Id at 2121-22.
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vail. It appears that the Court is saying that separateness by itself
is not unequal, and that the complainant has to prove that this sep-
arateness is unequal and unjust.
With these cases, the Supreme Court has reversed hundreds
of years of civil rights progress: in Wards Cove, the Court reversed
almost forty years of established precedent; in Runyon, almost 100
years; and in Croson, at least thirteen years. Now civil rights advo-
cates must attempt to overcome this devastating attack.
At the national level, civil rights advocates are advising their
local affiliates about alternative vehicles to fight white supremacy
and racial discrimination. Two alternative forums in which to
combat racism are being reexamined and utilized in this struggle:
first legislatures, both state legislatures and the United States
Congress; second, the state court systems. Federal courts will be
of little help because some theorists now believe that the federal
court door is closed to minorities. As evidence of this, a study re-
ported in the Washington Post, in January of 1989, revealed star-
tling disparities between the treatment of civil rights cases by
Reagan appointees and Carter appointees. 32 Carter appointees'
support of claimants' discrimination claims was approximately
four times higher than that of Reagan appointees.
33
Because the majority of federal judges are Reagan appoin-
tees, the federal courts are less receptive to these types of claims
than they had been in the past. Consequently, civil rights advo-
cates are taking their battles to the state legislatures and state
courts rather than the federal courts. The United States Senate,
where the Civil Rights Act of 1990,34 was recently introduced, also
seems to be concerned about these recent Supreme Court deci-
sions. In fact, thirty-four Senators have cosponsered the bill, intro-
duced by Senator Edward Kennedy.3 5 Although the bill has not
yet been passed and amendments are likely, civil rights activists
are hopeful it will pass and restore and strengthen civil rights laws
that ban discrimination.
32. Wash. Post, Jan. 29, 1989, at Al.
33. Id.
34. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec. S991 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990).
The Civil Rights Act of 1990 would overturn Patterson and Wards Cove. Id.
35. Id.

